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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALD GUNDRY and B R Y C E 
TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH; LOUIS DOMEN-
KO, Fiscal Officer, Utah Highway 
Patl'ol; LYLE HYATT, Commander, 
Utah Highway Patrol; and CLAIR 
R. HOPKINS, Chairman, Utah Com-
missioner of Finance, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10090 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs-appellants filed an action for declara-
tory judgment in the Third District Court of the State of 
Utah, regarding interpretation of 49-8-1 to 49-8-5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was heard on the lOth day of January, 
1964, before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, and at that 
time the plaintiffs-appellants were denierl any recovery of 
contributions made to the Retirement System of the Utah 
Highway Patrol. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants-respondents seek affirmance of the 
judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants-respondents accept the statement of facts 
as set forth in the appellants' brief. The amounts in con-
test are $1,048.12 for appellant Gerald Gundry and $884.-
25 for appellant Bryce Taylor, which represent the amounts 
of their contributions to the Utah Highway Patrol Retire-
ment Fund. There is no dispute as to these amounts, and 
the only questions to be resolved are the interpretation 
and intent of Title 49, Chapter 8, Sections 1-5, of the Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, and whether or not the appellants 
did agree to the deduction on the basis that they would not 
be refundable unless retirement age was reached. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS 
INTERPRETATION OF TITLE 49, CHAPTER 
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8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, DENYING 
THE APPELLANTS ANY REFUND OF THEIR 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HIGHWAY P A-
TROL RETIREMENT FUND. 
In Section 49-8-4, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, the qual-
ifications and exemptions are set forth as the only exclu-
sive manner in which any benefits or payments from the 
Highway Patrol Retirement Fund may be made. Further-
more, the last sentence of the first paragraph of that sec-
tion states: 
11* * * The highway patrol must keep this 
fund intact and in the amount necessary to meet 
the payments as determined by the actuarial sys-
tem." (Emphasis added.) 
It must be concluded, therefore, that the Legislature 
did not intend for any contributions to be returned or pay-
ments made, other than those specified in this section, to 
any employee or his legal representative who did not satisfy 
the qualifications of the section heretofore mentioned. 
In the book by Crawford, Interpretation of Law, Sec-
tion 195, pages 334 and 335, he states: 
"As a general rule, in the interpretation of 
statutes, the mention of one thing implies the ex-
clusion of another. It therefore logically follows 
that if a statute enumerates the things upon which 
it is to operate, everything else must necessarily, 
and by implication, be excluded from its operation 
and effect. * * * If the statute directs that 
certain acts shall be done in a specified manner, or 
by a certain person, their performance in any other 
manner than that specified or by any other person 
than one of those named, is impliedly prohibited." 
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This is a general rule of statutory construction and is wide-
ly followed throughout the federal and state courts. See 
N elden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 Pac. 524 ( 1899); Have-
meyer v. Superior Court, 84 Calif. 327, 24 Pac. 121; Page 
V. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338. 
A general maxim of statutory construction is the gen-
eral presumption that a court gives to the constitutionality 
and validity of a statute duly passed by a legislature until 
clear and convincing evidence of its invalidity or unconsti-
tutionality is established. Sutherland, Statutory Construc-
tion, Vol 2, Sec. 4106, p. 288. Also see Gravell v. Benson, 
285 U. S. 22, 76 L. Ed. 598, 52 Sup. Ct. 285. 
It is always incumbent upon any court when called 
upon to interpret a statute or statutes to strive to avoid 
a construction or interpretation which will tend to make 
the statute ineffective or unproductive or not achieve the 
most good as it is presumed that the Legislature wanted 
in the passage of the particular act. In this instance, pur-
suant to a 1960 actuary study which had been accomplished, 
pursuant to Section 49-8-5, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, by 
Walter C. Green, Actuary, the Legislature had been ad-
vised by the Utah Highway Patrol that it would increase 
the contribution of the employees to allow and make feas-
ible and make actuarially sound the refunding or paying 
back of contributions to Utah Highway Patrol employees 
who quit or did not qualify under the retirement provisions 
of this act. 
The actuary estimated an increase of 1.68% of salary 
would be required to afford the repayment of contributions 
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on page 9 of the June 30, 1960 Actuarial Report. This 
would have increased the Utah Highway Patrol's contri-
bution from 7.26/o to 8.94% of salary, which the actuary 
n\commended but the Highway Patrol male employees 
voted and refused the proposal. 
It is also noteworthy that when the 1961 Legislature 
amended Section 49-8-4, no provision was made for the 
refund of any contributions other than those specified in 
the amendment in Section 49-8-4, U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended, and hence, by clear implication, the Legislature 
refused to increase any donation by the State for refund 
of contributions. 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, 
Sec. 4702, page 334, states: 
"There is no safer nor better settled canon of 
interpretation than that when language is clear 
and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it 
plainly expresses.'' 
There are several Utah cases which hold directly in 
favor of the position of the defendants. The case of Han-
sen v. Public Employees Retirement System Board of Ad-
rninistration, et al., 122 Utah 44, 246 P. 2d 591, in which 
it was alleged that the Retirement Act was abrogating the 
vested rights of the plaintiff Hansen and/ or was, in fact, 
unreasonably discriminatory, the Utah Supreme Court in 
its decision clearly covered the points as follows : 
"An act is never unconstitutional because of 
discrimination, so long as there is some reasonable 
basis for differentiation between classes which is 
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related to the purposes to be accomplished by the 
act, and so long as it applies uniformly to all per-
sons within the class." 
See Utah v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L. 
R. 330; Slater v. Salt Lake City, 155 Utah 476, 206 P. 2d 
153, 9 A. L. R. 2d 712. The court also stated in the Hansen 
case: 
"A county employee does not acquire vested 
rights in a pension system prior to fulfillment of 
the conditions required, but restraint should be 
placed upon injustice which could eventuate from 
permitting wholly unreasonable and arbitrary en-
croachments upon advantages which may have ac-
crued to employees who have worked out subtan-
tially all of necessary conditions prerequisite to 
qualifying for a pension." 
The court went on further to state: 
"The overwhelming weight of authority is that 
an employee such as Hansen who has neither served 
the necessary years to qualify for a pension, nor 
attained the retirement age, has no vested right in 
the pension or the retirement system." 
The court furthermore determined that this was not 
discriminatory against defendant Hansen because the ap-
plicability was justified and stated as follows: 
"* * * Our function is to determine whether 
an enactment operates equally upon all persons sim-
ilarly situated. If it does, then the discrimination 
is within permissive legislative limits." 
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The court also stated: 
"* * * Length of service is a fair and logi-
cal criterion by which to classify employees under 
retirement systems and the liquidation thereof." 
Thus, it will be noted that the Utah Supreme Court 
definitely ruled that an employee does not acquire vested 
rights in a pension system prior to fulfillment of the stat-
utory conditions which are set forth for qualification for 
payment therefrom. Clearly, in the case at hand, neither 
plaintiff has the statutory requirements to participate and, 
hence, has no vested interest or right in the pension sys-
tem or any contribution therein. See Gall v. City of Wheel-
ing, et al., 192 S. E. 116. These funds, then, when con-
tributed, were not placed in trust or in a fiduciary capacity 
for the individual benefit of the plaintiffs herein, but were 
placed in a specific fund to accomplish certain specific 
functions for all those who comply and come under Sec-
tion 49-8-4, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, heretofore men-
tioned and, therefore, are not personal moneys of the plain-
tiffs but are, in fact, public moneys to be used as desig-
nated by the Legislature in this act. See Gall v. City of 
Wheeling, supra. 
The Hansen case may be distinguished from a 1943 
Utah case, Driggs v. Utah Teachers' Retirement Board, 
105 Utah 417, 142 P. 2d 657, in which the court ruled: 
"A school teacher, who was retired under 
teachers' retirement act and had made the required 
contributions and met the prescribed conditions, 
had a 'vested right' in his whole retirement allow-
ance as provided by the act at time of his retire-
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ment, and a subsequent amendment to the act could 
not be construed as reducing amount to which 
teacher was entitled." (Emphasis added.) 
There is a difference between the Driggs case and the 
facts of the case at hand. The plaintiffs, unlike the Driggs 
case, have no vested interest whatsoever because they have 
not met the prescribed conditions or qualifications as set 
forth in the Highway Patrol Retirement System in Title 
49, Chapter 8 of the Utah Code Annotated. Furthermore, 
the 1961 amendment to Section 49-8-4, U. C. A. 1953, did 
not alter the retirement program at all but merely made 
provision for additional retirement pay, and, did not jeop-
ardize or reduce in any way any retirement and even al-
lowed the contributions of an employee who had not quali-
fied to be refunded to his legal representative. 
In a later case, Backman v. Bateman, 1 U. 2d 153, 263 
P. 2d 561 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court further stated: 
"* * * But until a member fulfills all the 
conditions precedent, he has no vested right to a 
pension or an annuity and the system may be abol-
ished leaving him without the expectancy of a pen-
sion. Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement Sys-
tem, Utah, 246 P. 2d 591." 
Chief Justice Wolfe further went on to state, in a con-
curring opinion in the Backman case : 
"* * * If a member voluntarily leaves the 
employ of the district in which the association to 
which he belongs has been organized; if he leaves 
because the board of education does not renew his 
contract; or if he dies while a member but leaves 
no dependent relatives, he knows that under the 
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Act there will be no return of his contributions. But 
unless the Legislature impliedly reserved the right 
to deal in any manner it may choose with a mem-
ber's contributions, he is assured by the Act that 
except (1) if he voluntarily withdraws from em-
ployment, or (2) if the board will not renew his 
contract, or (3) if he dies before retirement, he 
cannot be deprived of his interest in the fund." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is a well-reasoned definite rule that in the case of 
compulsory contribution pension systems it has been widely 
held throughout the United States in numerous jurisdic-
tions that there is no right to a refund of the employee's 
cont'ributions upon his death, resignation, or dismissal 
prio,r to eligibility for pension benefits, absent a provision 
in the pension statute authorizing a refund of any of his 
contributions. 52 A. L. R. 2d, p. 469. The great weight of 
authority is to the effect that the fact that a person has 
made compulsory contributions does not give him a vested 
right in the pension. 54 A. L. R. 945; 98 A. L. R. 505; 112 
A. L. R. 1009; 137 A. L. R. 294. See also Graven v. Scott 
(1937), App. Div. 514, 292 N. Y. S. 771 (resignation of 
employee); Donovan v. Rye (1946), 271 App. Div. 836, 65 
N. Y. S. 2d 737 (dismissal of employee); Richards v. 
Geneva (1936), 161 Misc. 572, 292 N. Y. S. 397 (resigna-
tion of employee); Genther v. Valentine (1939), 172 Misc. 
38, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 935 (death of employee). 
There is little doubt, pursuant to the Utah cases here-
tofore mentioned, that Utah follows the majority rule as to 
compulsory contributions to a retirement system and will 
not allow any vesting of any interest in the pension or any 
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right to contributions unless the statute specifically pr~ 
vides for vesting or return of any contribution. 
The Utah Legislature, by implication, is assumed to 
have knowledge of all similar other acts it has passed in 
regard to pension plans. The various types of retirement 
systems within the the State are varied and differ widely 
as to what becomes of the contributions of the employees, 
giving a clear indication that the Legislature was aware 
of the problems of contributions and intended a forfeiture 
in the Highway Patrol Retirement System. 
The policeman's Pension Fund, which was originally 
enacted in 1945, in Section 49-5-2, U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended, specifically provides that "he shall be paid back" 
if he does not qualify for retirement all amounts contrib-
uted by the employee. 
The Judges' Retirement Act, in Section 49-7-5.6, U. C. 
A. 1953, as enacted by the 1963 Legislature, provides that 
a person or his beneficiary who does not qualify or become 
eligible for retirement will receive his full contributions 
back, plus interest. 
The Public Employees' Retirement System of the State 
of Utah, in Section 49-1-68, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, 
which section was passed by the 1961 Legislature, allows 
the refund of all contributions made by the employee plus 
regular interest thereon upon his not qualifying for retire-
ment, with the additional provision that the employee may 
elect to leave his money in the Retirement System and 
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remain a member of said System and draw interest on his 
money. 
The School Employees' Retirement Act, in Section 53-
29·20, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, provides that contribu-
tions shall be paid back for any person who does not qual-
ify for retirement less a withdrawal fee, which is to be set 
by the Retirement Board by regulation. 
The Firemen's Pension Fund, in Section 49-6-2, U. C. 
A. 1953, as amended, is apparently a half-way mark in that 
it allows that a fireman, after one year's service and upon 
termination of his employment for any cause, shall be re-
funded by the State Treasurer 60% of the amount con-
tributed by him. 
Then, the opposite end of the above mentioned retire-
ment systems, i.e., Policemen's, Judges', and Public Em-
ployees' Retirement System, is that no part of the contri-
bution shall be given back if the employee voluntarily re-
signs from the Highway Patrol Retirement System. 
It should be noted that regardless of whether the plain-
tiffs 'vere advised or not at the commencement of their 
employment, any and all amounts contributed to the High-
way Patrol Retirement System would be lost or forfeited 
unless they continued in such employment for a period of 
20 years; and regardless of whether the plaintiffs were 
or were not advised by a later meeting in the 1960 actuary 
study of an additional charge to change the system in or-
der to allo'v refund of contributions without qualification 
for retirement, there is no statutory provision to allow any 
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such refund and there is no vesting of any interest pur-
suant to the Utah law and, therefore, the plaintiffs have 
forfeited any and all amounts paid into the program. 
Even though the law generally abhors forfeitures and 
statutes may be construed strictly to prevent them, the 
courts must give to statutes that provide for a forfeiture 
such a construction that will be consistent with justice, 
reason and the legislative intent to protect the fund and 
keep it actuarially sound. Datta v. Stabb, 344 P. 2d 977, 
173 C. A. 2d 613. 
In a well reasoned Oklahoma case, Pirkey v. State, ex 
rel. Martin, 327 P. 2d 463, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
stated: 
"Courts will not force on a forfeiture statute 
a construction which amounts to a reading into the 
statute of provisions not inserted therein by the 
Legislature.'' 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah statutes do not allow any refund of the 
Utah Highway Patrol Fund to be made other than those 
specified in the statutes, as indicated, and the decision of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. SPRATLING, JR., 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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